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TESTIMONY
OF STATE SENATOR LIZ KRUEGER BEFORE THE CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS OVERSIGHT REGARDING THE SEPTEMBER 13TH
PRIMARY ELECTION AND THE CURRENT STATUS OF HAVA COMPLIANCE Friday, September 23rd, 2005 Good morning. My
name is Liz Krueger, and I represent the 26th As a State Legislator, I submit that we, the Legislature,
failed the residents of While I am pleased at the Legislature’s decision to require voter-verified paper ballots, it is important to note that several features of the PBOS technology continue to make it more transparent and reliable than DRE’s. The paper ballot is easier for voters to understand and to use. Recounts of paper ballots are far easier than a recount of the rolled up paper trail that DRE systems produce. I strongly urge that the City of
A recent report by the California Institute of Technology (CalTech) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that touch screen DRE systems had the highest rates of spoiled, uncounted and unmarked ballots. Manually counted paper ballots had the lowest average incidence of spoiled, uncounted, and unmarked ballots, followed closely by optically scanned ballots.
A reliable voting technology is a basic requirement for the integrity of the City’s elections. Equally important, that technology must be transparent and inspire voter confidence. The State’s mandate for voter verified paper ballots guarantees that an election can be audited if the Board of Elections determines that an audit is necessary, and decides to undertake one. However, if the City chooses a DRE system, votes will be counted in a relatively opaque electronic process. Computer technologists overwhelmingly agree that it is impossible to ensure that these systems are not flawed or corrupted. If the Board of Elections decides to audit a DRE process, counting all of the voter-verified ballots and reconciling the discrepancies with the electronic tally will be time-consuming and expensive.
In addition to being the most accurate, secure, transparent and accessible voting technology available, PBOS is also the least costly. According to New Yorkers for Verified Voting, in a voting district with three lever machines, the cost for DRE machines will be $36,000. The cost for the PBOS machines with a ballot-marking machine will only be $10,000. Maintenance and storage costs – which will not be paid by federal funds – are significantly lower for the optical scanners than for the DRE machines. Because PBOS systems are simpler and more straightforward, it is both easier and cheaper to train election assistance workers for PBOS systems. No one knows the expected life of a DRE machine, but some predict that they will have to be replaced in five years, to be paid by either the state or local government. Finally, the federal Election Assistance Commission has estimated that their Voluntary Voting System Standards will be available in early 2008; PBOS systems are guaranteed to meet those standards, but DRE systems may not. I would also like to point to recent stories coming out of
Both NYPIRG
and Common Cause share my concern that a strong lobby effort from voting
machine manufacturers is influencing The significance of this decision must not be
underestimated. HAVA creates an
opportunity for the City to replace our outdated lever machines with modern
voting equipment; but neither the federal government, nor the State has taken
the necessary steps to ensure that our new equipment is reliable, secure and
transparent. The final decision for
HAVA compliance now comes down to the local level and I strongly urge that
the decision makers choose PBOS systems for Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. |
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